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In 1991 the international agenda of the
Pacific Islands was dominated by eco-
nomic development and environmental
issues. Economic development had
ostensibly always been a central task of
the multilateral institutions of the
region, and environmental concerns-
for example in relation to nuclear test-
ing, the dumping of radioactive wastes,
and the incineration of chemical weap-
ons-had often appeared on the
regional agenda. Nevertheless, the
developments of 1991 amounted to a
significant change in thinking about
the extent to which, and how, regional
collaboration might be pursued in rela-
tion to such issues. They did not just
become a new priority in the rhetoric
of regionalism, dominating, for exam-
ple, the deliberations of the South
Pacific Forum meeting at Palikir, Pohn-
pei, in July; there was also significant
institutional change, increased avail-
ability of resources, and new policies.
These issues were also linked conceptu-
ally in the general acceptance within
the South Pacific Forum of the notion
of "sustainable development" and in
the broader notion of "regional secu-
rity" that gained ascendancy in the new
post-Cold War environment.
An important indication of the new
priority accorded environmental issues
in 1991 was the implementation of a
1990 proposal to create a fully autono-
mous regional environmental agency
similar to the Forum Fisheries Agency
or the South Pacific Applied Geo-
science Commission. There was
already in existence a small regional
environmental program (SPREP) man-
aged by the Forum Secretariat, the
South Pacific Commission (spc), and
the United Nations Environment Pro-
gram and housed within SPC headquar-
ters in Noumea. However, that
arrangement was seen as too restrictive
in terms of the expanded role and high
priority that Pacific Island states now
envisaged for such a program. Under-
lining SPREP'S new autonomy, it was
decided that it should move to head-
quarters in Apia in 1992. In view of the
jealousies and tensions between the SPC
and the South Pacific Bureau for Eco-
nomic Cooperation (SPEC) that
attended the old SPREP'S establishment
within the SPC in 1978, it is notable that
the move to autonomy, and physically
out of SPC headquarters, was achieved
without rancor. Concerns that there be
equality between independent states
and territorial administrations in the
governing body of the new agency were
assuaged, and the transition proceeded
smoothly with the support of the South
Pacific Commission.
The new agency has been given a
fourfold increase in budgetary
resources and staffing. This means that
its new staff will be about half the size
of the SPC and Forum secretariats,
making SPREP a major regional institu-
tion in the network of the South Pacific
Organizations Coordinating Commit-
tee (spocc). The old SPREP, though
grossly understaffed, was already
involved in a wide range of programs
concerned with natural resource man-
agement, conservation of biological
diversity, control of marine pollution,
coastal resource management, environ-
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mental education, assistance with
national environmental management
strategies, climatic change, and sea-
level rise. The new SPREP, under a
slightly restructured program, will
cover the same range of issues, but
greater emphasis will now be given to
its role in coordinating and pressing a
regional position in relevant interna-
tional forums and in relation to global
legal conventions concerning particular
environmental matters.
In 1991 SPREP focused on the coordi-
nation of a regional position at the pre-
paratory meetings for the United
Nations Conference on the Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED) to be
held in Brazil in June 1992. As part of
this process, a Ministerial Declaration
on Environment and Development was
issued at the SPREP Intergovernmental
Meeting in July, and a South Pacific
regional statement was presented at the
third meeting of the UNCED Prepara-
tory Committee in August. A second
focus of SPREP'S role in collective diplo-
macy in 1991 concerned the pressing of
a South Pacific position in relation to
negotiations on a Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change.
The other significant issues on the
regional agenda in 1991 came under the
general heading of economic develop-
ment. The prominence of these issues
did not simply result in more resources
being devoted to existing programs.
Underlying the discussions and policy
changes were changing notions about
how national development might best
be promoted and about the role that
regional collaboration might play in
that process. Essentially, this change
amounted to an acceptance in 1991 of
four propositions:
that national development is depen-
dent on a strong export-oriented
private sector;
that regional programs have a role
to play in developing these national
private sectors and accordingly
should give greater emphasis to
"issues involving the private sector
including trade and investment";
that the Forum Secretariat should
become more directly involved in
providing assistance to individual
member countries in relation to
structural adjustments and other
development strategies; and
that the Forum Secretariat should
develop a regional development
plan incorporating a unified set of
development priorities for all
regional institutions, and should
coordinate negotiations with donors
seeking to contribute to regional
programs.
What was being developed was a
role for the regional organizations as a
resource to assist national development
planners, as well as to provide a collec-
tive voice aimed at influencing the mar-
ket and investment structures within
which the island countries have to
operate. This is not integration as in
the European Community model.
There is no attempt to integrate the
regional market, labor force, or prod-
uct. Rather, the role for international
collaboration under this model is col-
lective diplomacy (an integration of
diplomatic resources) and the provi-
sion of a regional research and techni-
cal capacity to supplement national
capacity.
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Although "regional security"
remained on the agenda, it was a very
different conception from the one that
prevailed in earlier years. It did not
emphasize regional collaboration to
exclude the influence of a potentially
undesirable state, which had been a
dominant notion during the Cold War.
Indeed, during the 1991 Forum the
Australian foreign minister suggested
that consideration be given to making
the Soviet Union a dialogue partner.
Nor did the prevailing conception of
regional security include the discussion
or resolution of security problems
within, or foreign policy orientations
of, particular states that were perceived
to threaten regional order. Such a view
of regional security was observable in
the past. Significantly, there was no
attempt to raise Bougainville as a
regional security issue in the way that
Australia and New Zealand had sought
to raise the issues of the Fiji coups, the
links with Libya, and the Soviet fishing
agreements with Vanuatu and Kiribati.
In the late 1980s some saw the actions
of a sovereign state as an important
part of the regional security agenda.
Yet the worst internal security problem
the region has seen has not been raised
at the regional level, partly because no
Cold War context exists, and partly
because Australia and New Zealand
are not anxious to repeat the Fiji expe-
rience and they agree with the Papua
New Guinea government's approach.
The prevailing conception of
regional security in 1991 was a broader
one that had for some years appealed
to most island states but was embraced
with less enthusiasm by the larger
Western countries involved in the
region: the real threats to South Pacific
security are environmental, economic,
or posed by organized crime, drug run-
ners, and carpetbaggers. With the end
of the Cold War the larger states could
also actively support this broader
notion, as was evident in Australia's
and New Zealand's initiative in seeking
regional coordination of law enforce~
ment in relation to organized crime and
drug running. Although it may seem
obvious that military threat would be
emphasized less in, for example, the
Australian view of the post-Cold War
security environment in the region, this
does not necessarily follow. Some in
defense circles in Canberra believe that
the broader Asia-Pacific region is more
open to military threat, particularly if
the United States presence diminishes
and a "vacuum" is created. However,
the Australian government has not
sought to influence regional security
discussions in that direction in the
Pacific Islands (as it has in Southeast
Asia).
The changing priorities and changes
in conceptualization evident in the 1991
regional agenda largely reflected the
changing global context. Part of the
context was provided by the changing
structures and practices of the global
economy within which the island states
were working. Just as such change had
given new impetus to regional collabo-
ration elsewhere-for example in
North America, Southeast Asia, and
Latin America-the need to compete
on the changing world market, and to
make economies leaner, pushed eco-
nomic development higher on the
regional agenda. The context was also
influenced by the transformation in the
economic philosophies underlying the
new policies, affecting both the way in
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which development was conceptual-
ized in the Pacific Islands and the per-
ception of an appropriate role for inter-
national collaboration in the process.
Another significant part of the new
context was the change in perceptions
and state practices associated with the
end of the Cold War and with the disin-
tegration of the Soviet Union. This
brought economic and environmental
issues to international attention. They
were seen as the new priorities-or
threats-of the age. This change in per-
ception-and, in the case of environ-
mental issues, the release of new
resources for cooperation on them-
created a new context for their consid-
eration in the island region. The end of
Cold War thinking took military secu-
rity issues off the regional agenda and
changed perceptions of nonmilitary
issues that had previously been viewed
through Cold War lenses.
There was a remarkable degree of
agreement among Pacific Island coun-
tries, and among larger states involved
in the regional institutions, about the
approach taken to these economic,
environmental, and security issues in
1991. Absent were the big rifts that had
characterized past attempts to agree on
priorities, conceptualization, and nec-
essary policies in these areas. There
was no important division along the
lines of Melanesian versus Polynesian,
territorial administration versus inde-
pendent state, metropolitan versus
island state, francophone versus
anglophone Pacific, or smaller island
state versus larger island state. The
Palikir Forum, in particular, was seen
as a model of cooperation after the
divisiveness and resentment associated
with the Vila Forum in 1990. This may
have been partly because the then Aus-
tralian prime minister could not
attend, and because Australia did not
seek to promote a major regional ini-
tiative. The Melanesian Spearhead was
not a force at this Forum, despite
agreeing on certain regional objectives,
including Forum observer status for the
FLNKS, at their meeting in Santo earlier
in the year. The absence of Walter Lini
and Solomon Mamaloni, and the
strained relations between Honiara
and Port Moresby over the Bougain-
ville issue may have contributed to this
lack of action.
The institutional changes associated
with the decisions on economic devel-
opment, environmental, and security
issues should further strengthen the
capacity of the region to influence the
international structures within which
Pacific Island states operate, and to
work more effectively within existing
structures. In their approach to these
issues, the island states are further
developing the use of collective diplo-
macy, which has proved to be a
remarkably successful strategy for
them in recent years, particularly in
relation to driftnet fishing, radioactive
waste dumping, and obtaining United
States recognition of their right to exer-
cise jurisdiction over migratory species
of fish.
The regional institutional network
appeared to be more settled in 1991.
This was not always the case. The
struggles over which organization
would gain jurisdiction over a particu-
lar program, who could be a member
of what organization, whether or not
the region should move to a single
organization, and the relative rights of
various members of particular organi-
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zations, had provided the high politics
of regionalism. In 1991 there was a gen-
eral acceptance of the SPocc network,
both by those who would have pre-
ferred to go further in the rationaliza-
tion process toward a single regional
organization, and by those who saw
the new structure as a front for the
Forum.
The successful move of SPREP out of
the SPC and into the spocc network as
an independent agency was a good test
case. The success results partly from
the way the SPocc structure circum-
vents the thorny issue of the Forum's
strict membership criteria. The various
agencies in the spocc network allow
membership or offer services to territo-
rial administrations that would not
qualify for Forum membership, per-
mitting a rationalization of the cooper-
ative process without threatening the
political purity of the Forum itself. A
further test of this system may eventu-
ate if plans announced in 1991 by the
new director of the Forum Fisheries
Agency (FFA), Sir Peter Kenilorea, to
bring all fisheries programs under the
FFA, are accepted. The carrot he held
out to SPC members who do not qualify
for Forum membership is that FFA ser-
vices would be made available to them.
This may be too much for the sup-
porters of the SPC, who may view this
as a further denuding of SPC programs,
particularly after the loss of SPREP.
The regional system was further
strengthened by the decisions made
during the year on several key regional
posts. The choice of the former Kiri-
bati president, Ieremia Tabai, as Henry
Naisali's successor in the director-gen-
eral's slot at the Forum Secretariat was
a popular one. The appointment of
Jacques Iekawe from New Caledonia
as secretary-general at the SPC, though
more contentious, brings a very experi-
enced administrator to the job, as does
the appointment of Philipp Muller
from Western Samoa as director of
SOPAC, and Jioji Kotobalavu from Fiji
as executive secretary of the new Joint
Commercial Commission. Sadly, how-
ever, Iekawe died unexpectedly on 10
March 1992, before assuming office.
Although the developments of 1991
generally suggested a strengthened
regionalism and wide acceptance of the
SPocc regional structure, one house-
keeping issue suggested that old rival-
ries and tensions are not far below the
surface. The question of the proposed
new site for the SPC dominated the
South Pacific Conference in Nuku-
'alofa in October, opening up a number
of old wounds and causing a significant
new rift in the Pacific Island commu-
nity.
Siting issues have always been
highly contentious because of the eco-
nomic and political benefits associated
with hosting an international institu-
tion; nevertheless it seemed as if a con-
sensus had been reached on the future
site of the SPC headquarters when the
South Pacific Conference opened in
October. The issues involved had been
exhaustively canvassed in several pre-
vious conferences and committees. In
1991 the subcommittee charged with
examining the issue recommended
acceptance of a French government
offer of a site in Noumea called Receiv-
ing. The subcommittee's choice re-
flected the fact that the Noumea
authorities had refused refurbishment
or rebuilding at the Anse Vata site that
the SPC has occupied since 1948 on the
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grounds that it had been rezoned for
tourist development. But the choice
was only recommended after guaran-
tees were obtained from the French
government that it would pay the bulk
of the building costs, subsidize operat-
ing costs, and offer security of tenure.
With these concessions won, the issue
was thought to be over. The recom-
mendation was accepted by the Com-
mittee of Representatives of Govern-
ments and Administrations (CRGA)
immediately prior to the meeting of the
Nuku'alofa conference. Consequently,
most delegates and observers were sur-
prised that this issue not only domi-
nated the conference, but also created
deep divisions among its members.
During the conference, however, it
became clear that all delegations,
except those from the French Pacific,
were upset with the way the French
government and the Noumea authori-
ties had sought to push the SPC out of
the Anse Vata site. A division grew
then between those who felt that
despite the way in which this had been
done there was no choice but to go to
the Receiving site and those who felt
that an alternative site outside New
Caledonia should be considered. The
former included the Melanesian coun-
tries who were supporting Receiving
on the grounds that it was important to
keep the SPC in Noumea for "Kanak
sovereignty," in the belief that they
were supporting the wishes of the
FLNKS. The Melanesian countries were
in a strange alliance with France,
which also spoke of Kanak sover-
eignty; American Samoa and the Cook
Islands, who felt that due process had
been observed and saw no alternatives;
and New Caledonia, whose Kanak rep-
resentative said it was important for
Kanak development that the SPC move
out of Anse Vata. On the other side
were Fiji, Tonga, Tuvalu, Marshall
Islands, and Western Samoa.
The expression of discontent with
Receiving as the only option could
have been seen as a last jibe at France
before accepting the CRGA recommen-
dation, but the intervention by Fiji's
minister for Trade and Commerce,
Berenado Vunibobo, ensured that the
differences would turn into a serious
rift. The minister attacked island dele-
gates for their lack of statesmanship in
allowing the French government to get
away with pushing the spc off its land
and accused them of being bought off
by France's "thirty pieces of silver." He
also attacked the subcommittee for not
having seriously explored other poten-
tial sites outside Noumea and for pro-
ducing a "lousy" report, and the French
delegate for daring to present the argu-
ment for Receiving in terms of Kanak
sovereignty, something the French had
shown little regard for in the past. He
concluded his dramatic speech with an
eleventh-hour offer to host the new
headquarters in Suva with the building
costs met fully by the Fiji government.
As a result of the minister's interven-
tion the siting question was reopened.
Although there was considerable
resentment on the part of some dele-
gates about the timing of the offer and
the manner in which Vunibobo
attacked other delegates, the confer-
ence agreed to delay its decision so that
Fiji's offer, and other offers if forth-
coming, might be considered. A special
South Pacific Conference was sched-
uled for March 1992 to make a final
decision on the matter. By the end of
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the year it looked as if there would be
at least three proposals on the table-
for Suva, Pape'ete, and Receiving in
Noumea.
As it stands, it will be difficult to
reach a compromise. The Melanesian
countries are highly unlikely to back a
proposal that goes against the wish of
the FLNKS to keep the SPC in Noumea.
They are particularly unlikely to back a
move to Suva, following what they saw
as Vunibobo's insulting behavior
toward them. On the other hand, it is
difficult to imagine a situation where
Fiji, Tonga, Tuvalu, and others would
accept a move to Receiving. The only
option on which a compromise is pos-
sible is one that is currently not on the
table, namely to rebuild at Anse Vata.
Although this would entail a reversal of
French policy and possibly the French
state overriding New Caledonian
views, it is quite probable that this
could happen. That the considerable
anti-French feeling expressed in rela-
tion to the issue at the South Pacific
Conference already threatens the diplo-
matic gains that the French govern-
ment has achieved in the region over
recent years would not be lost on the
French government. Further, the FLNKS
has subsequently made it clear that its
preferred position is that the SPC stay at
Anse Vata (not move to Receiving so
that tourist development might aid
Kanak development as was thought at
Nuku'alofa). This allows the Melane-
sian countries to move their support to
redevelopment of the Anse Vata site
and removes the "Kanak development"
figleaf from the French defense of the
move to Receiving. If the French gov-
ernment does not act to defuse the situ-
ation, this issue could damage relations
within the SPC and the Forum, and
even undermine the delicate under-
standings on which the SPocc regional
network is based.
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